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ABSTRACT 
 
Darwinism and Lamarckism before and after Weismann: A Historical, Philosophical, and 
Methodological analysis.  
 
Francis J. Cartieri 
 
 
Chair: Sandra D. Mitchell 
 
 
When exploring the relationship between two reputedly competitive scientific concepts that have 
persisted, with modification, through time, there are three main features to consider. First, there 
are historical features of an evolving relationship. Just as a causal story can be reconstructed 
concerning adaptations in a complex system, an analogous story can be supplied for the historical 
contingencies that have shaped the organization and development of Lamarckian and Darwinian 
biological thought, and their interactions, over time. Second, there are philosophical and 
conceptual features to the relationship-- what is shared, what is not, whether two ideas inherently 
conflict or conditionally conflict, etc. Third, there are methodological features to the 
relationship—how do the theoretical concepts interact when in realistic operation? What are the 
benefits and constraints regarding their co-application? This project will explore the historical, 
philosophical, and methodological characteristics of the infamous Darwinian-Lamarckian 
dichotomy as characterized through Lakatos’ Methodology for Scientific Research Programs, 
with the hypothesis that, once the respective evolutionary philosophies are generalized and the 
clutter of stigma removed, there is a large degree of compatibility to be found among them. The 
justification for this project derives from the recent resurgence of interest in Lamarckian 
phenomena and the stern, often vehement backlash that has greeted that interest. If biologists and 
philosophers both resist, or worse dismiss, Lamarckian suggestions on the grounds that they 
perceive them to undermine and conflict with Darwinian lines of thought, then that resistance 
may be unconstructive and misguided, should it be the case that, just as it was with Darwin’s 
original conception of evolution, a more flexible, pluralistic view is plausible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
From the mid to late 19th Century, the dominant research program accounting for 
evolutionary phenomena was comprised of elements of Lamarck’s Zoological Philosophy 
and Darwin’s Origins of Species. Working scientists, and Darwin himself, took the 
presence of widespread variation and heritability of that variation to be an issue properly 
addressed only with appeal to the Inheritance of Acquired Characters (IAC) and the 
effects of use and disuse. The evidential climate of the time allowed and encouraged 
compatibility of Darwin’s account and elements of Lamarck’s account. When the two 
programs once again became distinct, it was not a result of their inherent 
incompatibility, but a result of the presentation of divisive new evidence, for which 
neither traditional Darwinian principles nor traditional Lamarckian principles could 
account. In reacting to the divisive evidence set, characterized by the Weismannian 
doctrine of the late 19th century, the dominant Darwinian research program produced 
two novel programs, each confining themselves to exclusive scientific niches and 
responding in distinct ways to the new evidence set. Reformulated as Neo-Lamarckism 
and Neo-Darwinism, the two research programs diverged in their development and 
application as long as the divisive evidence set continued to be held as fact by most 
biologists. In fact, in reacting to the Weismann doctrine, each new formulation took a 
position conceptually opposed to the other. On the Neo Darwinian side, the Synthesis 
served to rigidify the philosophy that variation is random with respect to the environment 
and genetic factors account for all aspects of heredity, making Natural Selection on 
heritable random variation the only force relevant in evolution. Neo Lamarckism, 
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confined primarily to the social sciences, paleontology, developmental biology and 
embryology, asserted that non-genetic factors contribute to development and 
development controls heredity, and as such, Inheritance of Acquired Characters and 
other non-genetic factors play a significant role in evolutionary phenomena. With the 
modern rejection of the original divisive evidence set, the two theoretical programs stand 
at a curious and ambiguous relation to one another. On the one hand, the two programs 
today continue to successfully account for various phenomena within their problem 
domains. On the other, their longstanding isolation and opposition has resulted in an 
apparent rigidity that disallows flexibility regarding points where the programs disagree. 
It will be the aim of this paper to make clear the conceptual relations between the two 
research programs of modern Darwinism and modern Lamarckism. It is my suspicion 
that a careful philosophical analysis will reveal more compatibility than incompatibility, 
with the recognition that the Neo-Lamarckian program offers a proximate explanation of 
the generation and maintenance of variation at biological levels of analyses that are 
lower than the discrete phylogenic individual upon which Neo Darwinism concentrates. 
This is not to say that every element of each program can be at once tacked on to the 
other with perfect harmony. Quite the contrary: the historical and logical analysis will 
serve to show exactly why this is not possible, and why there are areas of the two 
programs that are indeed contradictory to one another. However, that there are areas of 
significant overlap between the two is likely, and with the degradation of the causes for 
their logical incompatibility, the potential benefits of a more forgiving relationship 
between a Darwinian line of thought and a Lamarckian line of thought are many and 
promising.    
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Methods 
 
When exploring the relationship between two reputedly competitive scientific 
concepts that have persisted, with modification, through time, there are three main 
features to consider. First, there are historical features of an evolving relationship. Just as 
a causal story can be reconstructed concerning adaptations in a complex system, an 
analogous story can be supplied for the historical contingencies that have shaped the 
organization and development of Lamarckian and Darwinian biological thought, and their 
interactions, over time. Second, there are philosophical and conceptual features to the 
relationship-- what is shared, what is not, whether two ideas inherently conflict or 
conditionally conflict, etc. Third, there are methodological features to the relationship—
how do the theoretical concepts interact when in realistic operation? What are the 
benefits and constraints regarding their co-application? This project will explore the 
historical, philosophical, and methodological characteristics of the infamous Darwinian-
Lamarckian dichotomy as characterized through Lakatos’ Methodology for Scientific 
Research Programs, with the hypothesis that, once the respective evolutionary 
philosophies are generalized and the clutter of stigma removed, there is a large degree of 
compatibility to be found among them. The justification for this project derives from the 
recent resurgence of interest in Lamarckian phenomena and the stern, often vehement 
backlash that has greeted that interest. If biologists and philosophers both resist, or worse 
dismiss, Lamarckian suggestions on the grounds that they perceive them to undermine 
and conflict with Darwinian lines of thought, then that resistance may be unconstructive 
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and misguided, should it be the case that, just as it was with Darwin’s original conception 
of evolution, a more flexible, pluralistic view is plausible.   
 
II. CRITICAL HISTORY 
 
 
“Our attitudes towards the great problems of biology are shaped by historical 
contingencies.” –Raff, 1996 
 
In this section, I will discuss the numerous transformations of Darwinian and 
Lamarckian lines of thought as scientists and philosophers of various domains adjusted to 
changing evidence sets over time. As the goal of this project is to assess the modern 
relationship between Darwinian thinking and Lamarckian thinking, we will need some 
structured description of just what delineates those modes of evolutionary thinking from 
one another. Of course, the difficulties in providing a non-arbitrary account of the 
transformations of Darwinism are many (Lennox 1995, Gayon 1995), and worse, the 
collection of ideas commonly referred to as “Lamarckian” is so loose and disjointed that 
they can hardly be said to comprise a rigid theory of evolution on their own. Despite 
these difficulties, there is a way in which Neo-Darwinism, in each of its fluctuating 
forms, remains Darwinian, through adherence to a core set of principles that may be 
construed as Darwinian. In the same way, formulations of Lamarckism differ widely, but 
can be understood as “Lamarckian” in that they adhere to a general mode of thinking 
about evolutionary problems. If we are to ascertain the level of conflict between a 
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Darwinian mode of evolutionary thought and a Lamarckian one, then it is at the level of 
the most general expressions of the philosophies that we must begin. For this purpose, 
Lakatos’ notion of the Research Program1 will be helpful; it may be used to zero in on 
the set of interrelated concepts that express the most essential and consistent elements of 
Darwinian and Lamarckian thinking, respectively.  
A research program is a series of general concepts, theories or hypotheses that 
share a common ‘hard core’ of general assumptions about the domain of problems, or 
problem domain, to be explained, but which are individuated in terms of their particular 
sets of peripheral, auxiliary hypotheses; these are called the ‘protective belt.’ The 
hypotheses, assumptions, and observations of the protective belt support the hard core. 
They may be refined, adjusted, and replaced over time without compromising the identity 
of the research program itself, so long as the hard core remains unchanged. This is 
Lakatos’s negative heuristic: a methodological stipulation that the hard core must not be 
fundamentally modified. As Lakatos explains, “the negative heuristic forbids us to direct 
the modus tollens at this ‘hard core’” (Lakatos, p. 135). Instead, attempts at falsification 
and testing are to be redirected at the protective belt of auxiliary assumptions that are 
required by the hard core of the program. This is the positive heuristic—it tells 
researchers how to augment the general program through its protective belt, without 
compromising its essential character. Through modification of the protective belt, a 
research program may increase the accuracy and scope of its predictions and accounts of 
                                                
1 I acknowledge that there are alternative methods for characterizing scientific history in 
Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, Feyerabend and others. My choice of Lakatos’ MSRP is 
motivated by its ability to account for the operation of several competing programs at 
once, its simplicity, and for it’s rational for the continued support of degenerative 
programs in the history of science, as Lamarckism most certainly has been. 
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its problem domain(s), thereby achieving progressive status. A program that fails to do 
this is degenerative. So, we also have a guide for judging the relative success of research 
programs with relation to each other—more progressive programs are favorable to 
degenerative, or less progressive, programs (p. 137). However, it should be noted that a 
degenerative program may again become progressive, so it is not irrational to remain 
committed to a degenerative research program (p. 155). This point is partially why it 
makes sense to evaluate Lamarckism as a research program—it had become degenerative 
at various points in history, followed by brief periods of progressive development. Where 
Popper would have us regard the Lamarckian position as falsified by modus tollens2 (and 
disregard it), Lakatos’ MSRP suggests only that it may be less favorable than a related 
progressive program, though it would not be irrational to continue to pursue a 
degenerative program, because the modus tollens may only imply the falsification of 
some auxiliary hypotheses, rather than the hard core of the program.  
For an example, over time the Aristotelian hard core of an earth-centered universe 
and perfect circular orbits had to be burdened with many ad hoc hypotheses to account 
for ellipses, variable velocities, retrograde motion, etc., and it became degenerative. It 
was replaced by a program with the same problem domain, but characterized by a 
                                                
2 This falsification strategy implements the modus tollens relation of deductive logic: 
-If P then Q 
-Not Q 
-Therefore, not P 
Since modus tollens is a valid deduction argument form, it is rational to reject the 
conclusion “not P” only if one can show that one, or both, of the premises are not true. 
Applications of this falsification strategy are widespread within science, even in the early 
stages of its development. Aristotle, for example, dismissed the suggestion of Herodotus 
that female fish conceive by swallowing the milt produced by males. He noted that if 
Herodotus’s hypothesis is true then there is a passageway from mouth to uterus. Aristotle 
maintained that dissections reveal that there is no such passage. (Popper, Karl, The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery, 1954) 
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Copernican ‘hard core’ with Kepler’s elliptical information as part of the protective belt, 
and this program was far more progressive and less ad hoc—it competed with and 
eventually replaced the Aristotelian program. Similarly, we can track the development of 
the relationship between Darwinism and Lamarckism by characterizing them as research 
programs, identifying their respective problem domains, hard cores, and protective belts 
as they have changed over time. In doing so, it should become clear in what way the 
programs relate to one another, compete, contradict, and share with each other. 
Certain periods in history have seen more or less friction between the two 
programs, and the following sections will reveal the states of the two programs at those 
particular moments when the relationship between Lamarckism and Darwinism shifts: 1) 
the relation between both original programs, 2) the period of transition (Neo Lamarckism 
and Neo Darwinism are created) characterized by Weismann’s doctrine and Mendelian 
heredity, 3) the state of the programs after they are isolated to different problem domains, 
and 4) the state of the programs today, given a “porous” Weismann barrier. I will begin 
with the research program initiated by Lamarck, as it was introduced half a century 
before the Darwinian research program.  
  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPLETE LAMARCKIAN PROGRAM 
 
By 1815, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had articulated what he believed to be “a truly 
general theory, linked everywhere in its parts, always consistent in its principles, and 
applicable to all the known data.” This “truly general theory” is the original Lamarckian 
Research Program. It was nothing less than the union of a wealth of empirical 
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observations of the natural world (empirical hypotheses of the protective belt) and a 
guiding philosophy of life (general assumptions of the hard core) that accounted for a 
large problem domain: “the source of existence, the manner of being, the faculties, the 
variations, and the phenomena of organization of the different animals” (Lamarck, ZP, p. 
184).  
Though Lamarck had established himself as a master systematist rivaling Linnaeus 
among his own contemporaries, he considered his work in nascent biology and evolution 
(incidentally, Lamarck actually coined the term ‘biology’) to be his most difficult, 
ambitious, and ultimately, his most important contribution to human understanding 
(Lamarck, 1809). However, Lamarck’s general theory was almost universally ignored 
(Corsi, p. 207); at best, he faced polite indifference, and at worst, outright slander and 
ridicule (Madaule, p. 13). From the very outset of its publication, Lamarck’s Zoological 
Philosophy was repeatedly misinterpreted, his ideas misquoted, and his name 
misappropriated. Unfortunately, the distortion of his ideas did not cease upon Lamarck’s 
death--even his academic eulogy, tragically written by his adversary Georges Cuvier, 
served to confuse and malign Lamarck’s ideas on the evolution and organization of 
nature (Cannon, 1959). The reception of Lamarck’s program has special relevance 
because Darwin’s notion of Lamarck’s general theory was largely secondhand (most 
notably from Lyell). He did not take it to be a viable program that stood or fell as one 
whole, but a collection of independent suppositions, some of which he incorporated into 
the protective belt of his particular research program, others he simply rejected. I will 
discuss this further when considering the Darwinian research program.   
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Lamarck was inspired by the successes of Newton in providing a unified scientific 
account of the motion of heavenly bodies and earthly motion in general; he hoped to find 
similar success in accounting for the complexity of all biological life. In grand fashion, he 
hoped to find and describe nature’s plan (Glass, 1959). Particularly, Lamarck stressed 
that there is an obvious trend of increasing complexity among living things, and that this 
complexity was derived over time during the history of life, not through special creation 
events. Just like the laws governing the motion of planets and stars, Lamarck assumed 
that there must be active properties and plans that guided, and continue to guide, the 
evolution of life-forms, resulting in the natural and fine gradations observed by himself 
and others of his time (Jordanova, 1984). Lamarck, it must be noted, had not restricted 
his professional analyses to living matter; he published widely on geological and marine 
history as well (Bowler, 1989). From his observations in geology, he recognized that the 
earth, though having undergone gradual and sometimes sudden changes over its long 
history, had not become more complex. Thus, he reasoned, because the state of the 
organic world is more complex than it was in the past, living matter must tend toward the 
more complex via inherent guiding properties (contra directionless geological change). 
He was perhaps no less influenced by social, political and economic theories than by his 
own observations of the natural world. For example, Lamarck was known to take 
frequent walks with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in various letters it is apparent that he 
applied some of Rousseau’s political philosophy to the natural world (and perhaps vice-
versa, to be fair) (Madaule, 1982). From the ideological French climate and his 
observations of the natural world and his phylogenic series, Lamarck developed a two-
factor approach to account for the problem domain of present biological organization and 
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successive biological change, consisting of 1) the natural inherent progress of organic 
development from simple to complex forms and 2) the modification of this progress by 
constraining external circumstances resulting in creative adaptations to changing 
environments (Burkhardt, 1977). 
 By 1809 in his Zoological Philosophy, Lamarck reports on the natural progress of 
evolution directed by nature and the distorting and random effects of accidental 
circumstances (the environment): “The state in which we now see animals is on the one 
hand the product of the increasing composition of the organization, which tends to form a 
regular gradation, and on the other hand that of the influences of a multitude of very 
different circumstances that continually tend to destroy the regularity, the gradation of the 
increasing composition of organization“ (Lamarck, 1809; not my emphasis). This two 
factor approach to the problem domain of his research program forms the hard core of the 
Lamarckian Research Program.  
Another important tenet of Lamark’s thought involved the subordination of certain 
biological features in relation to others (Burkhardt, 1977). He attributed more superficial 
changes, like those that distinguish species from one another, to the influence of 
circumstances on evolution (factor 2 in chart below), and the development of the more 
essential and incorporated features (organs, blood types, etc.) to the inherent properties of 
life, sometimes called “the power of life.” This means that the evolution of structures 
such as the eye and nervous system were the result of the properties of the cellular fluids 
of life (complexifying force), while features such as sexual dimorphism or tooth structure 
were primarily determined by alterations of habit in response to changing circumstances 
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(adaptive force). These two forms of explanation were to go on to form the protective belt 
of Lamarck’s research program. 
 
An additional element of Lamarck’s problem domain, that of the presence of 
fossils of living things no longer on earth, demanded an explanation by the 1800’s. 
Where the catastrophists appealed to biblical disasters as evidence of both geological 
change and the disappearance of older animals (Hodge, 2008), Lamarck developed the 
view that organisms are highly mutable with respect to their changing environments; 
organisms possessed a natural inherent tendency to increase in number, size and 
complexity, but would, in adapting to changing circumstances, cause alterations to their 
forms through new habits and behavioral patterns. The great flexibility Lamarck 
attributed to living things caused him to deny the regular occurrence of extinction 
events—we don’t see animals in the fossil record because they have transformed into 
other creatures over time.  
 
In 1809, Lamarck was introducing a fundamentally new research program 
composed of a general problem domain, a two-component ‘hard core,’ and a set of 
auxiliary hypothesis that, when conjoined with the hard core, accounted for the 
phenomena of the problem domain.  The problem domain—the general set of phenomena 
to be addressed by the program—can be taken to be general organic change over time 
(macro-evolution) and local adaptation (micro-evolution). Because it appears that the 
problem domain is naturally divided into two general problems, the original, circa 1809, 
“hard core” of the program also had two general components: a complexifying force (Le 
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pouvoir de la vie) and an adaptive force (L'influence des circonstances) that have resulted 
in the regular and specialized gradations among species, respectively. He summarizes the 
hard core of his program in Zoological Philosophy: 
 
“ Nature, in producing successively all the species of animals, beginning with the most 
imperfect or most simple in order to end her work with the most perfect, has gradually 
made their organization more complex; and with these animals spreading generally 
throughout all the habitable regions of the globe, each species received from the 
influence of the circumstances in which it is found the habits now recognized in it and the 
modifications of its parts that observation shows to us…”  (ZP 1809) 
  
Finally, the protective belt of Lamarck’s theory is a collection of more specific 
hypotheses that apply the hard core to empirical cases, and allow for the operation of the 
hard core to real phenomena. Lamarck’s four laws of evolution, reproduced below, are 
part of the protective belt of his program and when taken together, serve as a mechanism 
for localized adaptation.  
 
Four Evolutionary Laws (from his Natural History of Invertebrates), 1815:  
 
1. Life by its own forces tends continually to increase the volume of every body that 
possesses it, as well as to increase the size of all the parts of the body up to a limit which 
it imposes upon itself.  
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2. The production of a new organ in the body of an animal results from a new need 
arriving unexpectedly and continuing to be felt, and from the new movement which this 
need initiates and maintains.  
 
3. The development of organs and their power of action are always proportional with the 
use of these organs.  
 
4. Everything that has been acquired, delineated, or altered in the organization of 
individuals during their life is preserved by generation and transmitted to new individuals 
proceeding from those which have undergone these changes.  
 
In addition to the above “four laws,” the protective belt of the Lamarck’s program 
requires some mechanism of heredity that supports the four laws and the hard core. 
Lamarck assumed that the Inheritance of Acquired Characters (IAC) was allowed by the 
modes of heredity that applied to his problem domain, though he made no effort to 
develop one himself (as Darwin did with pangenesis), noting merely that offspring 
always tend to resemble their parents. One adjustment that was made within the 
protective belt served to deal with the presence of very simple forms of life. Lamarck’s 
hard core predicts that living matter tends to continually develop towards complexity. If 
the earth is sufficiently old, we should not see extremely simple forms of life, as they 
should have developed into more complex forms. The notion of spontaneous generation 
was an auxiliary hypothesis that allowed for the continual creation of simple forms of 
life. Notice, the modus tollens is directed at the protective belt, not the hard core of 
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Lamarck’s program. Specifically, the hard core (complexifying force) predicts 
widespread complexity, but observation shows the presence of very simple life forms, 
counter to the prediction of the hard core. However, an auxiliary hypothesis, continuous 
spontaneous generation of simple life forms, accounts for the anomalous observation, and 
protects the hard core from falsification, because the hard core is always associated with 
a set of auxiliary hypotheses, and these are to be blamed for incongruence between a 
program’s predictions and actual observation.  
 
 
So to summarize:  
 
Lamarckian Research Program before Weismann 
 
Problem Domain: Organic change over time and local adaptation. 
 
Hard Core: 1) There is an inherent force in living matter that results in a progression 
from simple to complex structure: a tendency toward progressive development. 2) 
Organisms habits and forms are sensitive to modification by environmental 
circumstances: adaptation occurs via IAC.   
 
Protective Belt: Mechanism of heredity that allows for IAC, blending inheritance, effects 
of use/disuse, spontaneous generation, very long timescales, etc. 
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THE DARWINIAN PROGRAM BEFORE WEISMANN  
 
Darwin began writing manuscripts for the Origin at a time when the notion of 
species mutability and evolution at large was gradually becoming more acceptable 
(Hodge, 2008). There was, however, no generally accepted account in place of how 
evolution might proceed, at least in Britain, that researchers could work under. While 
Lamarck had forwarded a complete research program accounting for the development 
and organization of life over fifty years earlier, his theory had suffered from a lack of 
immediate positive reception, critical failure, and numerous distortions (Cannon, 1959). 
The result of his program’s reception, and subsequent misrepresentation in Britain, would 
have major effects on the development of Darwin’s research program.  
 
Charles Lyell’s work had a profound impact on Darwin’s thinking (especially his 
requirement that historical processes should be explained using extant processes), and the 
two became close acquaintances. It was the case that Darwin, along with many other 
English naturalists, became familiar with Lamarck’s ideas through Lyell and his 
Principles of Geology. That is to say, they became familiar with Lyell’s Lamarck, not 
Lamarck’s Lamarck. In the second volume, he characterizes what he calls “Lamarck’s 
theory of the transmutation of species” in quite disparaging terms. He says of Lamarck’s 
program, for example, that 
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“Lamarck talks of the efforts of ‘internal sentiment,’ ‘the influence of subtle fluids,’ and 
the ‘acts of organization,’ as causes whereby animals and plants may acquire new organs, 
he gives us names for things, and with a disregard to the strict rules of induction, resorts 
to fictions, as ideal as the ’plastic virtue,’ and other phantoms of the middle ages.”  
(PG vol. II, p.8) 
 
Besides his charge that Lamarck’s program ignores “the rules of induction,” Lyell 
repeatedly observes that there is no positive evidence to support the mechanisms required 
by Lamarck’s research program: “We point out to the reader this important chasm in the 
chain of the evidence… but the plain truth is, that there were no examples to be found.” 
He directly attacks the Lamarckian hard core as ungrounded, “…gratuitous 
assumption…of a point so vital to the theory of transmutation, [as to be] unpardonable on 
the part of its advocate.” (p. 9) While Lyell thought the Lamarckian hard core to be 
ungrounded, he noted that its implications for evolution, “however staggering and absurd 
it may seem, is logically deduced from the assumed premises,” and endeavored to show 
that, even granted Lamarck’s ungrounded assumptions, his program fails as a viable 
theory of transmutation.  
 
However, Lyell certainly did not initially accept any account of the transmutation 
of species, though he admitted some natural flexibility to them (p. 18). Despite this, he 
argues against the unlimited flexibility that he claims Lamarck to endorse, and 
emphasizes that species are real entities with limits to manipulation. (p. 35) Later, in 
letters to Darwin after the publication of the Origin, Lyell would reverse his position, 
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noting: “When I came to the conclusion that after all Lamarck was going to be shown to 
be right, that we must `go the whole orang,' I re-read his book, and remembering when it 
was written, I felt I had done him injustice.” (Letter 4041 — Lyell, Charles to Darwin, C. 
R., 15 Mar 1863).  
 
The injustice, of course, had already been committed during the formative period 
of Darwin’s research program, and as such, Darwin did not consider Lamarck’s original 
program as either a viable account of its problem domain, or even as one inseparable 
whole program. Given Lyell’s account of Lamarck’s program, Darwin was able to 
incorporate a major element of the Lamarckian program into the protective belt of his 
own research program. This was possible because the original “hard core” of the 
Lamarckian program had ceased to be protected, as it were, by its protective belt, both 
because there was a lack of supporters for the whole program in Britain, and because two 
supposed implications of the Lamarckian program—spontaneous generation and no 
extinction—were taken to be false, and no modified hypotheses were given to replace 
them in the protective belt. Having developed a sense that Lamarck’s initial program was 
insufficient as an account of its problem domain from Lyell, Darwin’s program subsumed 
the most viable elements from the Lamarckian hard core and protective belt into the 
protective belt of his own program, in support of a new, distinctively Darwinian hard 
core:  
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Darwinian Research Program before Weismann. 
 
Problem Domain: Organic change over time and local adaptation. 
 
Hard Core: Species are linked through common ancestry: changes in species are 
primarily due to Natural Selection acting on heritable variation among populations of 
individuals.  
 
Protective Belt: Mechanism of heredity that allows for production and maintenance of 
variation and IAC, geological distribution of species, blending inheritance, effects of 
use/disuse, IAC, ubiquitous variation, Struggle for Survival, relations between species, 
etc.  
 
Darwin’s program adequately described extinction as an inevitable result of the 
selection of better-adapted varieties over more poorly adapted varieties in life’s Sturggle 
for Existence. It also anticipated an evolutionary structure as primarily that of a randomly 
branching network, not one of inherent progress from simple to complex arising from the 
continuous generation of simple life forms, as Lamarck’s program did. The above 
generalization of the two research programs should make it plain that their hard core 
assumptions deeply conflict with one another. The programs share identical problem 
domains, but make fundamentally different, inflexible assumptions about them. 
Lamarck’s hard core assumes that there is force inherent in nature that results in 
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increasing complexity, and that complexifying force is primarily responsible for the 
observed organization of the taxa; Darwin’s hard core assumes quite the opposite. The 
primary force in generating the observed taxa is Natural Selection, a blind and stochastic 
process, and there is no “built in” tendency in individuals to progress from simple to 
complex forms. Selection may as well favor more simple forms, and this is why we see 
the preservation of very simple species—not because they are continually arising via 
spontaneous generation. At first glance, it may seem curious that Darwin’s program 
incorporates elements of Lamarck’s, when it is evident that their hard cores directly 
conflict with one another. However, the original Lamarckian program, with its two-
component hard core, was not active in Britain when Darwin wrote the Origin, and we 
may assume Darwin shared Lyell’s sentiment regarding the insufficiency of Lamarck’s 
program at large: 
 
“…if species were not created separately, they must have descended from other species: 
& I can see nothing else in common between the Origin & Lamarck. I believe 
[Lamarck’s] way of putting the case is very injurious to its acceptance; as it implies 
necessary progression & closely connects Wallace's & my views with what I consider, 
after two deliberate readings, as a wretched book; & one from which (I well remember 
my surprise) I gained nothing” (Letter 4038 — Darwin, C. R. to Lyell, Charles, 12–13 
Mar [1863]).  
 
So Darwin was dealing with what he perceived to be a dead research program that 
took as its hard core opposing assumptions to his own program’s. However, he could 
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excise ½ of Lamarck’s hard core and subvert it to a supporting role within the protective 
belt of his own research program, because the notion of IAC and use/disuse helped to 
deal with the problem of blending, the disappearance of useless organs, and other 
phenomena within the problem domain of his program. Doing so did not risk reviving the 
entirety of the Lamarckian program (which would indeed have been incompatible with 
Darwin’s program), because the part of the Lamarckian hard core relating to IAC was not 
inextricably bound up with the assertion that life is guided by a complexifying force. 
Thus, support for IAC within Darwin’s program did not mean support for the entire 
Lamarckian program as it had been originally conceived.3  
 As has been said, the ½ of the hard core that Darwin appropriated from Lamarck’s 
program was perceived by Lamarck himself to be an inherently unguided process—
unpredictable fluctuations in the environment for Lamarck resulted in specialized 
adaptation and “degradation” of nature’s organized procession towards perfection. The 
complete Lamarckian program was particularly interesting because it contained two 
seemingly opposing forces—Darwin appropriated the environmentally driven adaptive 
force as it conveniently obeyed the powers of Natural Selection. Insofar as Lamarck’s 
L'influence des circonstances is not taken to be universal for every single trait in every 
single individual, it serves only to aid Natural Selection within the protective belt 
                                                
3 The succession of the Copernican research program over the Ptolemaic program bears a 
good deal of resemblance to the succession of the Darwinian program over the 
Lamarckian program. The Copernican program arrived at a time when the Ptolemaic was 
incorporating increasing numbers of ad hoc hypotheses to account for phenomena such as 
equinoxes and inaccurate predictions of planetary position. The Copernican system 
incorporated the assumption of circular motion of the Ptolemaic hard core, but asserted a 
sun centered system as a better account observed changes in the positions of celestial 
bodies—the problem domain shared by both programs—and offered better predictions 
with fewer assumptions and a simpler overall structure. (Kuhn, p. 68) 
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Darwin’s research program. In decomposing the Lamarckian program into two separate 
components, one contradictory to Darwin’s program and the other supplemental, it clear 
how the half characterized by IAC persisted and flourished within the Darwinian 
program.  
 One important implication of Darwin’s incorporation of ½ of the Lamarckian 
program was his own program’s inheritance of the same hereditary requirements as 
Lamarck’s program. A mechanism of heredity was implied by the Darwinian program 
that allowed for environmental influences to affect germ material (IAC and use/disuse), 
for blending, and for the production and maintenance of widespread variation among 
individuals. Darwin’s provisional theory of heredity, pangenesis, satisfied all these 
requirements, though with little evidence to support it save the success of his own 
program that supported its existence. Pangenesis occupied the space in Darwin’s research 
program reserved for a mechanism of heredity that allowed for the hard core propositions 
of his program. Because pangenesis was also situated alongside the hypothesis of 
adaptation via IAC, the hypothesis of pangenesis accommodated the transmission of 
acquired characters. It accomplished this by postulating that all body cells continually 
shed tiny “gemmules” that concentrate in the reproductive center of the body before 
fertilization occurs. Because the cellular environment affects, to some extent, which 
gemmules are shed, the environment plays a role in the composition of the new 
individual (Gould, p.166). As Weismann would later show, removal of pangenesis and 
IAC from the protective belt of the Darwinian program would not compromise its 
identity. Such an event would, however, force those that still accepted IAC as part of the 
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hard core of their specific disciplines (social evolution, psychology, embryology, 
developmental biology, etc.) out of the Darwinian research program.  
 Another conclusion that must be drawn at this stage is that, if only ½ of the 
Lamarckian hard core is preserved and the other ½ is rejected, then we have the 
destruction of the original Lamarckian research program itself. And this is indeed the 
historical case. That the complete Lamarckian program contradicts the Darwinian 
program has been shown in principle—but at this stage in history, only an active and 
complete Lamarckian program contradicts the Darwinian program. Neo Lamarckism, 
which evolved from a synthesis of the remaining ½ of the Lamarckian hard core and the 
Darwinian concepts, is an entirely different beast, and its relation to the next instantiation 
of Darwinism, instigated by Weismann, will now be examined.  
 
WEISMANN AND THE CREATION OF A NEW LAMARCKIAN PROGRAM 
 
 Any discussion of the development and relations between Darwinian and 
Lamarckian ideas requires an understanding of August Weismann and his theory of the 
continuity of the germ plasm. Where the provisional hypothesis of pangenesis served to 
align Darwin’s hard core and the Lamarckian elements within the protective belt of his 
research program, Weismann’s theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm would 
represent its near total inversion. Weismann asserted that 1) hereditary material resides 
exclusively in “immortal” germ cells, and 2) that germ cells are fundamentally distinct 
from the somatic cells: 
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“…A marked antithesis exists between the substance of the undying reproductive cells 
and that of the perishable body cells. We cannot explain this fact except by the 
supposition that each reproduction cell potentially contains two kinds of substance, which 
at a variable time after the commencement of embryonic development, separate from one 
another, and finally produce two sharply contrasted groups of cells.” (Weismann, Essays 
Upon Heredity, p. 74)  
 
 If there is a fundamental barrier between the cells that are subject to 
environmental influences (somatic cells) and the cells that give rise to the next generation 
(germ cells), then IAC is theoretically impossible in any organism where the continuity of 
the germ-plasm is taken to be true, because somatic adaptations cannot be transmitted to 
the protected hereditary material. Just how universal the soma/germ-line separation is 
taken to be in the organic world has significant consequences for the modification of the 
Darwinian program. If soma/germ separation is universal, as Weismann argued, then IAC 
cannot play a role in explaining the Darwinian problem domain of biological adaptation, 
and further, pangenesis must not be correct. If soma/germ-line separation is not a 
universal feature of organic life, then IAC remains as a possible explanation of 
adaptation.  
Weismann’s Allmacht, an argument for the “all sufficiency of natural selection,” 
derives from the assumption that soma/germ separation is universal, and involves a 
modus tollens argument directed at the IAC auxiliary assumption within the protective 
belt of the Darwinian research program. If we recall that the IAC assumption in the 
Darwinian program is the remnant ½ of the original Lamarckian hard core, and that it 
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was responsible for accounting for local adaptation within that program, we can better 
understand why Weismann argued that the exclusion of IAC implied the universal truth 
of Natural Selection regarding an explanation of adaptation: 
 
“For there are only two possible a priori explanations of adaptations for the naturalist—
namely, the transmission of functional adaptations and natural selection; but as the first of 
these can be excluded, only the second remains… We are thus able to prove by exclusion 
the reality of natural selection… Once it is established that natural selection is the only 
principle which has to be considered, it necessarily follows that the facts can be correctly 
explained by natural selection” (1893, pp. 336-7).   
 
 At this point in time, only Wallace and Weismann argued that natural selection 
was the only explanation required to account for evolutionary phenomena. Their position 
represented a rigidifying of the Darwinian program, in two major ways. One, the 
exclusion of IAC from the protective belt means that all evolutionary phenomena under 
the problem domain of the program must be explained through Natural Selection alone. 
Second, the incorporation of Weismann’s doctrine into the protective belt of the program 
means that evolution is to be understood as the operation of natural selection on discrete 
individuals, because “…if not all cells contain heritable material, selection is necessarily 
on the individual, not on the cells or their constituents.” (Buss, p. 8) In light of these 
limitations, many researchers simply rejected the universality of Weismann’s rules, and 
continued to employ IAC as a valuable part of their more specific research programs.  
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This rejection was the case for some researchers, such as embryologists, because they 
saw that the particular cellular environment and cellular orientation determines the 
structure and organization of the developing individual. For others, such as botanists, 
their observations of plant development and reproduction did not agree with Weismann’s 
assertions—any plant cell can potentially become a new individual; the notion of an 
immortal germ line simply does not hold for botany. Still more researchers recognized 
the absence of any means of generating the variation that Darwin’s theory required, 
without IAC, if germ material is constant and un-altered across generations.  
In fact, Weismann was quite wrong about heredity in most respects. All cells in 
fact contain the material of heredity, DNA. Germ cells can sometimes be produced from 
somatic cells, even after an animal is neutered. Plants can reproduce new individuals 
from nearly any part—there is little or no sequestering of independent germ cells. 
Bacteria can incorporate hereditary material from the environment that is reproduced in 
subsequent generations.   
Despite all this, the implication of Weismann’s germ/soma distinction was 
gradually incorporated into the Darwinian program’s protective belt. The implication—
that the hereditary material that gives rise to the next generation is protected from the 
influence of features of the ontogeny that it produces—is called the Weismann barrier. It 
excludes Lamarck’s adaptive force from any program that takes the Weismann barrier 
seriously, as does the Neo-Darwinian program characterized by the synthesis of 
Mendelian genetics, Natural Selection, and Weismann. 
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Neo-Darwinian Research Program 
 
Problem Domain: Macroevolution and Adaptation (microevolution).  
 
Hard Core: Species are linked through common ancestry: changes in species are 
primarily due to Natural Selection acting on heritable variation among populations of 
individuals. 
 
Protective Belt: Mendelian genetics, Weismann’s barrier, Mutation, Population genetics  
 
 
 
The ½ core of the original Lamackian program that was divorced from the Neo 
Darwinian protective belt did not simply disappear. Forced out of Neo Darwinism by the 
Weismann barrier, it was taken up by researchers in a diverse set of fields that felt that 
selection on random heritable variation alone was not enough to account for all 
adaptation: 
 
“The idea of the inheritance of acquired characters had great breadth of appeal in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century. This appeal cut across 
both national and disciplinary boundaries, and it drew support from philosophical and social considerations 
as well as scientific ones…The Lamarckian position was supported in England, France, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Italy, Russia, and the United States by embryologists, paleontologists, physiologists, 
bacteriologists, and plant geographers. It seemed to fit well with the embryologist’s assumption that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, with the paleontologist’s fossil sequences that seemed to display the 
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accumulated effects of use and disuse, with the physiologist’s interest in causal rather than statistical 
relationships, with the bacteriologist’s understanding of the bacterium’s adaptation to environmental 
change, and with the plant geographer’s data on the geographic variation of forms. In a more 
straightforward manner than Darwinism, Lamarckism also seemed capable of explaining the degeneration 
of useless organs, correlated variation, and the origin of various kinds of instinctive behavior.” (R. 
Burkhardt, Lamarckism in Britain and the United States, p. 346)  
 
Until about 1920, Neo-Lamarckism was a viable research program, at least in the 
United States, which took as its problem domain the same phenomena as had Darwin’s 
original program. One of the program’s most interesting features was its incorporation of 
both Natural Selection on heritable variation, and Lamarck’s adaptive force as its hard 
core. Despite establishing a school dedicated testing IAC, the American program failed to 
provide singular proof of IAC in operation (Cook, p. 434). With the rise of Mendelian 
genetics and its synthesis with Natural Selection, support for IAC would continue to dry 
up unless a viable mode of heredity was found to allow for its operation. As it happened, 
no viable hypotheses were presented, and Lamarck’s adaptive force gradually fell from 
favor. “Rather than refutation, it faced a gradual loss of interest as the new science of 
genetics began to show the achievements that were possible with an alternative concept 
of heredity” (Bowler, p. 76) For its part, after a brief period of turmoil, characterized by 
the DeVries mutation controversy and the limitations of Weismannian heredity, the 
modified Neo Darwinian program had become a highly progressive research program 
with respect to its problem domain, while Neo Lamarckism still lacked a viable 
mechanism for IAC. As such, it was necessarily restricted to domains where the 
Weismann barrier does not play a major role. Most notably, this involves developmental 
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biology: “After the publication of Darwin’s origin of Species, but before the general 
acceptance of Weismann’s views, problems of evolution and development were 
inextricably bound up with one another. One consequence of Weismann’s concept of the 
separation of the germ line and soma was to make it possible to understand genetics, and 
hence evolution, without understanding development.” (JM Smith, Evo and Theory of 
Games, p. 6) Developmental biologists concerned with how an individual develops saw 
little value in the synthesis, which can make no comment on differences among 
developing cells and the effect of their environments. As C.O. Whitman put it, “We are 
no better off for knowing that we have eyes because our ancestors had eyes. If our eyes 
resemble theirs it is not on account of genealogical connection, but because the molecular 
germinal basis is developed under similar conditions” (Whitman, p.7) The Neo 
Lamarckian program presupposes the importance of the link between cellular 
environment and developmental adaptations, and as such it was well suited to that 
problem domain. 
 
Neo-Lamarckian Research Program 
 
Problem Domain: Development, cultural evolution, learning 
 
Hard Core: Organisms habits and forms are sensitive to modification by environmental 
circumstances; IAC.  
 
Protective Belt: Reverse Transcriptase, EIS’s, the Baldwin Effect, etc.  
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By the mid 20th century, the Neo Lamarckian program and Neo Darwinian 
program had become compatible insofar as they had taken as their problem domains two 
exclusive areas of phenomena. This exclusivity was caused by the union of the 
Weismann barrier and Mendelian genetics, which implied that if IAC occurs, it must 
occur in the absence of a Weismann/Mendel system of heredity. As such, the Neo 
Lamarckian program “budded off” of the larger Darwinian program when 
Weismann/Mendel were incorporated into the protective belt of the Darwinian program. 
The problem domain of Neo Lamarckism has been restricted to those areas left out of the 
modern synthesis, most notably developmental biology.  
As long as the Weismann barrier is assumed to be absolute, conflict between the 
Neo Lamarckian program and the larger Neo Darwinian program is impossible, as their 
problem domains cannot overlap. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
Weismann barrier is not absolute, that genetic inheritance is not the only means of 
inheritance, and that IAC may play a significant role in evolution. If the Neo Darwinian 
protective belt is not modified to accommodate these developments (to be discussed 
below), it risks becoming a degenerative program. However, the notion that some 
concept is “Lamarckian” tends to immediately disallow its consideration under the Neo 
Darwinian program, due in large part to a stress on what Popper would refer to as a 
competitive dichotomy, and that dates back to Lyell’s treatment of the original 
Lamarckian program, and more significantly, Weismann’s allmacht arguments asserting 
that selection and IAC are mutually exclusive. Below, I will examine the current nature 
of the Lamarckian-Darwinian dichotomy in light of the recent resurgence of interest in 
Cartieri 35 
Lamarckian adaptation. Following this, we can attempt to answer the question: what are 
the implications of a “porous” Weismann barrier for the Neo Darwinian/Neo 
Lamarckian dichotomy?  
 
III. THE MODERN DICHOTOMY 
 
 The failure of those working under the American Neo-Lamarckian research 
program to demonstrate IAC or to produce a viable mechanism of heredity seemed to 
confirm the Weismann barrier, and resulted in the limitation of that program’s problem 
domain to those areas of biology that were not properly addressed through the Neo 
Darwinian program. The subsequent lack of conflict between Neo Darwinism and any 
other evolutionary program has resulted in what Karl Popper has called “a too dogmatic 
adherence to Darwinism” (Popper, Evo Epistemology, p. 85). “Too dogmatic” is a 
negative accusation because Popper’s notion of healthy science, as well as that of Kuhn 
and Lakatos, involves competition among research programs. “The history of science has 
been and should be a history of competing research programmes (or, if you wish, 
‘paradigms’), but it has not been and must not become a succession of periods of normal 
science: the sooner competition starts, the better for progress” (Lakatos, p.155). Seeing 
no active competitive research program to challenge Neo Darwinism, Popper has 
suggested a reconsideration of Lamarckian lines of thought, despite his belief that “…the 
Lamarckian line… seems to have been mistaken. Yet it may be worth while to speculate 
about the possible limits to Darwinism; for we should always be on the look-out for 
possible alternatives to any dominant theory” (Popper, Evo Epistemology, p.85). It is 
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obvious that Popper views the “Lamarckian line” as a competitor to the Darwinian 
program. He is not alone. More than this though, Popper suggests that the Neo 
Lamarckian program represents an alternative to the dominant program, Neo Darwinism, 
which is a good deal stronger than suggesting that they are competitive. Two programs 
that are competitive must both be trying to explain some of the same things, surely. Their 
explanations must also differ in significant ways. However, two competitive programs 
are not necessarily alternatives, which would imply that one program could totally 
occupy the explanatory space of the other. Rather, they might only compete over a small 
overlapping problem domain, despite generally accounting for different phenomena. The 
two programs are perhaps alternatives with regard to the specific overlapping area of 
their problem domains, but they are not alternative research programs in general. In his 
Allmacht, Weismann asserted that there were only two possible options for explaining 
adaptation, and that they were alternative options: a competitive dichotomy. For him, the 
falsity of IAC implied the necessary truth of Natural Selection. Competitive relationships 
are not usually like this. Arguments for the unit of selection are often competitive with 
one another, but denying that selection does not occur on the group does not imply that 
selection must occur on the individual. Moreover, group selection theory could never 
replace individual selection theory, because group selection could never explain all the 
phenomena that individual selection explains—they are competitive with respect to 
particular problems, yes, but they are not alternatives with respect to the aggregate of 
both their problem domains. The distinction being made here is very important, because 
the overwhelming convention is to regard the Neo Lamarckian program as an alternative 
to Neo Darwinism. If a Neo Darwinian who thinks this way is confronted with a claim 
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labeled as “Neo Lamarckian,” it is no small wonder that she would resist its acceptance 
quite vigorously, because the implication of Neo Lamarckism being true could mean the 
replacement of her program by another. I believe this type of reaction, if misguided, does 
harm to the progress of biological science. Therefore, we should be sure to properly 
understand the relationship between Neo Darwinism and Neo Lamarckism today. In 
general, two research programs can be related in three different ways: 
1) Non-competitive: their problem domains do not overlap. 
2) Competitive, non-alternative: their problem domains share some overlap, but 
neither program could totally occupy the explanatory space of the other. 
3) Competitive, alternative: the problem domain of at least one of the research 
programs could totally occupy the explanatory space of the other. 
 
If we look back to my rationalized history of Darwinian and Lamarckian programs, it 
is interesting that the nature of their competitive relationship has dramatically changed 
over time. The original Lamarckian program and the original Darwinian program were 
competitive alternatives—they both shared the same problem domain and made opposing 
explanations for it. In fact, they were incompatible, because their hard cores directly 
contradicted one another: the complexifying force of Lamarck’s hard core suggests an 
inherent tendency to a specific end—complexity, where Darwin’s hard core assumes no 
inherent direction to evolution, only the effects of Natural Selection on heritable 
variation. Without the complexifying force, Lamarck’s hard core is left only with his 
adaptive force, which of course Darwin incorporated into the protective belt of his own 
program. The Darwinian program and the ½ Lamarckian program were competitive in 
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the sense that Natural Selection and IAC can both describe adaptation, but Darwin 
viewed IAC, as Lamarck did, as a secondary mechanism responsible for only some 
instances of adaptation.  
Weismann’s Neo Darwinian program takes all macro and micro-evolution as its 
problem domain, and asserts that only Natural Selection explains that domain. The Neo 
Lamarckian program of the same period competed to explain the same problem domain, 
but asserted that IAC plays a significant role in explaining adaptation. The two are thus 
competitive alternatives—they share the same problem domain but their explanations 
make opposing assumptions. 
Following the acceptance of Weismann’s barrier and Mendelian heredity, the two 
programs became non competitive, because they ceased to share any significant area of 
overlap. They were compatible only because they were explanatorily independent to one 
another.  
 Now, if it is the case, as Popper and most others believe, that the two programs 
are competitive alternatives, then they must at least share some area of overlap with 
respect to their problem domains. The widespread acceptance of Weismann’s barrier 
makes competition impossible, confining Neo Lamarckism to its own exclusive domain. 
So, it must first be established that conditions today are such that the Neo Lamarckian 
program can overlap with some of the Neo Darwinian problem domain, and for this to be 
the case, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) Weismann’s barrier must be porous, and 2) 
the proposal of a potential mechanism that allows for soma to germ-line feedback.  
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1. The porosity of the Weismann barrier.  
  
The Neo Lamarckian program’s hard core requires that information, at least in 
some cases and for some characteristics, flows from environment to hereditary material. 
The Weismann barrier is an assertion that heritable material only flows from germ cells 
to somatic cells, and never in reverse. This “barrier” prevents soma to germline feedback. 
While Weismann was wrong about there being a physical barrier around all germ cells, 
protecting them from outside influence, the implication that environmental information 
does not affect hereditary information finds a correlate in the Central Dogma. John 
Maynard Smith makes it clear what must be done if Neo Lamarckism is to be tenable: 
“The greatest virtue of the central dogma is that it makes clear what a Lamarckian must 
do—he must disprove the dogma.” (p. 66.)  
The Central Dogma represents a uni-directional information flow from 
DNARNAProtein. “It is not observed, nor indeed is it conceivable, that information 
is ever transferred the other way around…” (Grasse, p. 221.) However, in 1970 Howard 
Temin announced the discovery of “Reverse Transcriptase,” an enzyme that allowed 
RNA to transcribe its own DNA. Eventually it has been found that reverse transcriptase 
exists in most animal cells, common retroviruses, endogenous retroviruses, and 
transposable elements of DNA (Hoenigsberg, 2003). So one element of the Dogma often 
does not hold true—information can flow from RNA to DNA. It is conceivable that DNA 
could receive information about environmental needs through the action of reverse 
transcriptase; this is of course speculative, though Temin himself noted the possibility: 
“In extreme cases, one could imagine that a product of protovirus evolution would infect 
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the germ-line, become integrated there, and thus also affect progeny organisms. Such a 
process could provide part of a mechanism for inheritance of some acquired characters.” 
(H. Temin, p. iv.) Moreover, recently proposed Principle of Recursive Genome Function 
(Pellionisz, 2008) offers to challenge even the widespread belief that information does 
not pass from proteins to RNA or DNA.   
 The action of Reverse Transcriptase is proof of the mere possibility that the 
Weismann barrier is porous in terms of information passing from environment to DNA. 
However, DNA is not the only “hereditary material” to be carried across generations of 
reproducing individuals. Jablonka and Lamb identify four general types of Epigenetic 
Inheritance Systems (EIS’s): 1) Self-Sustaining Loops, 2) Structural Inheritance, 3) 
Chromatin Marking, and 4) RNA Interference (RNAi). Usually, biologists associate 
EIS’s with ontogeny and development, because EIS’s help to preserve gene expression 
across cellular generations. However, EIS’s can also be preserved across organismal 
generations, in most major taxa. “Epigenetic variations can be transmitted not only in cell 
lineages but also between generations of organisms…these variations play a significant 
role in adaptive evolution.” (Jablonka & Lamb p. 137) More importantly, epigenetic 
variations are often sensitive to environmental circumstances, such as with methylation 
patterns on DNA. In fact, EIS’s are evolutionarily valuable precisely because they allow 
the phenotype to adjust gene expression with relation to the state of the environment and 
the needs of the organism. That these environmental cues can be inherited across 
generations is another facet to the porosity of the Weismann barrier.  
 
2. A mechanism to allow for IAC.     
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While EIS’s may comprise a hereditary system on their own, the question remains as 
to whether epigenetic modifications actively alter germline DNA. However, a sound 
mechanistic hypothesis has finally been offered in support of the active inheritance of 
beneficial, somatically derived mutations. 
In 1979, E.J. Steele composed a hypothesis to account for the hereditary transmission 
of acquired immunological characteristics in mice and idiotypy in rabbits, called the 
Somatic Selection Hypothesis. The hypothesis is startlingly familiar, in that it echoes 
Darwin’s pangenesis theory, which earlier served as a bridging principle between the 
Darwinian program and Lamarck’s adaptive force. Steele even goes so far as to quote a 
passage from Darwin’s pangenesis theory in the opening section of his argument for the 
Somatic Selection Hypothesis. I have summarized the hypothesis for soma to germ-line 
feedback below (Steele, Somatic Selection, p. 55-56):  
 
1) Generation of somatic mutations and their clonal selection and proliferation under 
favorable environmental stimuli. (Ex. rapidly reproducing liver cells being 
somatically selected for toxin resistance) 
2) Capture of clonally packaged information by an endogenous RNA vector. 
3) Somatically selected mutant gene is inserted into germline DNA through reverse 
transcription. 
4) Darwinian selection for progeny with somatically acquired mutant gene. 
 
 The above mechanism could apply whenever there is somatic selection for a trait that 
improves fitness, such as specific toxin resistance among liver cells, or certain acquired 
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immunities. It does not, however, imply such ridiculous notions as a child’s inheritance 
of large arms from its blacksmith father or the giraffe’s long legs and neck resulting from 
its ancestors’ habit of stretching for high foliage. It should be clear that the somatic 
selection hypothesis, as well as EIS’s, do not result in the inheritance of just any acquired 
character.  
 The two conditions for competition are satisfied in light of the above recent 
developments. So it is at least possible that the Neo Lamarckian program’s problem 
domain be expanded to overlap with Neo Darwinism’s problem domain. But is Neo 
Lamarckism a competitive alternative? The simple answer is, no. If we consider the Neo 
Lamarckian program to consist primarily of Lamarck’s adaptive force resulting in 
adaptation, the program is simply too limited to engage with all of micro and macro 
evolution. For one, EIS’s and Steele’s hypothesis will only apply to a limited number of 
cases, so even with regard to localized functional adaptation, Neo Lamarckism cannot 
account for the full range phenomena. Weismann’s barrier is porous, but not always and 
not everywhere. In those places where Weismann still generally applies, Neo 
Lamarckism cannot compete with Neo Darwinism for explanatory roles. In this way, the 
two programs are competitive with regard to some areas, but exclusive to others: they are 
not alternatives.  
 At this point one may object that I have construed the Neo Lamarckian program too 
narrowly. So let us suppose that Neo Lamarckism is composed not only of Lamarck’s 
adaptive force, but also of the components of Neo Darwinism. The program asserts that 
both IAC and Natural Selection (along with genetic drift, the Baldwin effect, etc.) play a 
role in the micro and macro-evolution of organic life.  Now, we have something eerily 
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similar to Darwin’s original research program. Natural Selection on heritable variation 
still operates as it did before, only now Lamarck’s adaptive force is a possible 
explanation for adaptations under conditions where Weismann’s barrier is porous or non-
existent. If this version of Neo Lamarckism were set aside Neo Darwinism, we would 
have to conclude that Neo-Lamarckism is merely Neo-Darwinism with the additional 
claim that, in some conditions, IAC results in local adaptation and may contribute to 
speciation. This is essentially what Matsuda (1987) has offered with his proposal of “pan-
environmentalism.” He studied cases for which “a new evolutionary process was initiated 
by new environmental stimuli that have induced egg-size enlargement and consequently 
accelerated development” (p. 33). Pan-environmentalism expands the explanatory 
scheme of Neo Darwinism through incorporating the concepts of genetic assimilation and 
the Baldwin effect, though it does not alter Neo Darwinism’s “hard core.” In so doing, 
Matsuda, and others who would construe the Neo Lamarckian program very broadly, are 
not inventing an alternative to Neo Darwinism, but exploring ways of expanding the 
dominant Neo Darwinian program: its hard core remains the same, while the protective 
belt is adjusted to accommodate specific concepts such as genetic assimilation, EIS’s, and 
yes, even soma to germ-line feedback. Simply naming an expanded Neo Darwinian 
program something else does not create a competitive alternative; these are simply 
attempts to refine and optimize a very general program.  
 When Kimura (1983) argued for the importance of the random effects of “neutral 
selection” on the distribution of gene frequencies, he was forwarding a program that was 
competitive with standard accounts of how selection adjusts allele frequencies within 
populations. However, it does not make sense to characterize Kimura’s more specific 
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program as a competitive alternative to Neo Darwinism—he was challenging the relative 
significance of Natural Selection versus the random effects of his neutral theory on 
changes in allele frequencies in certain populations. The neutral theory takes for granted 
and accepts the general Neo Darwinian program, but competes with other accounts of 
change in allele frequency at lower levels of generality. After a few decades, the mini-
research program of ‘Neo-Darwinism + neutral theory’ is being re-integrated into 
mainstream Neo Darwinism. A widely construed Neo Lamarckism, of the pan-
environmentalism variety, would represent the same sort of competition for Neo 
Darwinism as the neutral theory—a competitive alternative for other programs explaining 
micro-evolution in various ways, but nonetheless subsumable by the larger, more 
mainstream Neo Darwinian program.  
 The mathematical population models of the Neo Darwinian program are designed to 
accommodate more variables than simple Natural Selection. Drift, mutation, draft, neutral 
selection, heterozygote advantage, etc. all can influence the spread of alleles through 
populations. There is no technical barrier to preventing the simulation of the effects of 
IAC within the population models of Neo Darwinism (DeCastro, 2006); it is simply 
another variable among many. The barrier, as has been said, is Weismann’s, and it has 
been integrated into the Neo Darwinian protective belt for far too long. Until this part of 
the Neo Darwinian protective belt is adjusted, there is no way for Neo Darwinism to 
accommodate Lamarck’s adaptive force. However, as the Neo Darwinian program has 
begun to incorporate the newly acknowledged discipline of evolutionary development, a 
field that takes the role of the environment very seriously, the prospects of a less 
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constraining Weismannian assumption replacing the more rigid version now accepted are 
increasing.  
 So a narrowly construed version of Neo Lamarckism competes with Neo Darwinism 
on a low level of generality and with regard to specific kinds of problems, say, speciation 
when certain conditions for the porosity of Weismann’s barrier are assumed to be met. At 
their most general level, these two programs are not competitive alternatives, as Popper 
imagines, and some modification of Neo Darwinism’s protective belt could even 
accommodate a role for IAC under certain conditions. A more widely construed Neo 
Lamarckian program, while a more complicated case, still does not offer the kind of 
competitive alternative that Popper suggests, because it merely represents an extension of 
Neo Darwinism’s explanatory tools, without a modification to the hard core of the 
research program. Regardless of how narrowly Neo Lamarckism is defined, it never 
occupies the role that has been allotted to it—one side of a competitive dichotomy 
opposing the whole of Neo Darwinism. To make this very clear we need look no further 
than those who allegedly work under a Neo Lamarckian program. Steele is an 
experimental immunologist. He accepts the hard core of the Neo Darwinian program, but 
rejects the more specific assertion that Weismann’s barrier prevents all IAC, and has tried 
to experimentally demonstrate his suspicions, to some success (Steele, 1998). Eugene 
Balon (2001) believes Neo Darwinism to be too gene-centric; sometimes phenotypic 
change precedes genotypic change, and EIS’s can “jump start” speciation events. Despite 
this, Balon accepts the assumptions of Neo Darwinism at a general level—disagreement 
occurs at lower levels of generality. If one desires a competitive alternative to Neo 
Darwinism, they would need something more akin to Intelligent Design, which asserts a 
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hard core that is contradictory to Neo Darwinism (I acknowledge ID is not a valid 
research program; my point is simply illustrative).  
 What is far more likely to arise, as far as competition between Neo Lamarckism and 
Neo Darwinism, are relative significance disputes. These are not arguments about what 
happens, or even what cause is the correct cause given some phenomenon, but which 
cause is more significant relative to the other. Within the research program of Neo 
Darwinism, there is an understanding that “evolution has resulted in a variety of 
reproductive systems, consistent with a variety of mechanisms of speciation. Faced with 
this variety, evolutionary biologists do not argue about which mechanism of speciation is 
the correct one; rather, they argue about the relative significance of each account” 
(Beatty, p. 346). When Darwin’s program incorporated Lamarck’s adaptive force in the 
19th century, the competition between Lamarckian and Darwinian explanation was 
exactly this sort—one of relative significance. That Neo Lamarckism today can 
potentially explain some adaptation and speciation does not imply a threat to the roles of 
Neo Darwinian models, it merely implies that multiple accounts may adequately describe 
some area of phenomena. Biologists know this to be the case, but Neo Lamarckian 
mechanisms are greeted with a special type of dismissal relating to the belief that they are 
part of an entirely alternative system, which is simply not the case.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Given that Lakatos, Popper, Laudan and Kuhn all view competition as a positive 
influence regarding the progress of science (Smith, 2003), the overwhelming tendency to 
consider the Darwinian/Lamarckian relationship to represent a competitive dichotomy is 
understandable. However, this tendency may have actually delayed scientific progress in 
rigidifying the endorsers of each program against claims made by the other, when the 
nature of their assumptions merits a more accommodating exchange of ideas. For 
example, “The heritability of suborganismal variation in many organisms is a necessary 
consequence of known developmental pattern. It is not only fact, it is one of the capital 
facts of biology. A significant source of genetic variation in a broad spectrum of 
organisms is simply not incorporated into modern evolutionary theory…the synthetic 
theory cannot be incorrect; it can only be incomplete” (Buss, p. 25). This 
“incompleteness” derives from biologists’ need to describe a process, evolution, which 
by its very nature produces a variety of interacting mechanisms requiring a variety of 
explanations. “To expect a single mechanism underlying an entire domain of biological 
phenomena, we would have to assume that one mechanism evolved in a common 
ancestor of all the taxa covered by the domain, and that the mechanism has been 
maintained in each of those taxa ever since, and/or we would have to assume that the 
very same mechanism arose independently and has been maintained in all the taxa 
covered by the domain” (Beatty, p. 436). Evolution is not so constrained, however. It is a 
creative process and as such, we should allow and even expect that some lines of descent 
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have developed ways of allowing for more successful adaptations via feedback from 
environmental pressures. The Neo Lamarckian program merely represents a particular 
explanation of speciation and adaptation among many others, and is amenable to a 
slightly modified Neo Darwinian program. The type of competition that would result 
from a resurgent Neo Lamarckian program would be the same that results from 
competition within the Neo Darwinian program: competition for relative significance. 
This kind of competition implies theoretical pluralism, not eliminative alternatives. Taken 
this way, the question ceases to be could a Neo Lamarckian program replace Neo 
Darwinism?, and becomes, how significant are Neo Lamarckian mechanisms in 
evolution, and how are we to incorporate them into the Synthetic theory?  
 
In 1987, Matsuda (p. 33) investigated the role of environmental stimuli on 
amphibian development and evolution via genetic assimilation. In a typical response, a 
review claimed that “there can be little point in taking Matsuda’s thesis seriously… 
because it does not fit traditional evolutionary theory.” (Duncan, 1985) It is this type of 
reaction that I hoped to address with this project. That Lamarckian programs of the past 
have at times represented incompatible alternatives to Darwinian programs is certainly 
the case. But research programs are evolving, flexible entities, and the relationship 
between the two discussed here has changed dramatically over time. Neo Darwinism may 
soon need to modify its gene-centric, Weismannian approach in order to account for a 
wider array of evolved processes that may include non genetic inheritance, IAC, and 
genetic assimilation, among others. In so doing, “traditional evolutionary theory” may 
find itself evolving around the Neo Lamarckian program, rather than against it.  
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